Introduction
Credit rating agencies such as Standard and Poor's (S&P), Moody's Investors Service (Moody's), or Fitch, Inc., provide qualitative statements on the creditworthiness of entities and their financial obligations. Use of credit ratings has expanded in recent years, mostly due to the globalization of financial markets, the growing complexity of financial products, and, generally, an increasing usage of ratings in financial regulation and contracting (Frost, 2006) .
The widespread use of credit ratings has been accompanied by a rise in the complexity of the rating information. Most credit rating agencies not only offer a rating for a company issuing securities and for the individual financial products issued, but supplement their service by providing additional information via rating outlooks and rating reviews ("watchlists") 1 that give indications of future credit rating changes. While rating outlooks represent agencies' opinions on the development of a credit rating over the medium term, 2 rating watchlists are stronger statements, as they focus on a much shorter time horizonthree months, on average (Keenan, Fons, and Carty, 1998) . 3 Review listings are usually triggered either by discrete corporate events such as, e.g., the announcement of a merger or a share buy-back, or by trends in a corporation's operations or financial conditions. A rating may be put on review for possible downgrade or upgrade or with direction uncertain. During the watchlist interval, the rating agency collects additional information on the firms it rates, which typically leads to an interaction between rating analysts and firm management. The watchlist is eventually resolved by the announcement of either a rating change or confirmation of the initial rating. The proportion of ratings "on watch" has sharply risen in recent years: until 1998 about 10 percent 1 Moody's reports ratings currently as being under review on their "Watchlist"; S&P refers to its "CreditWatch." In the following, we use the notions of rating watchlists and rating reviews interchangeably.
2 Rating outlooks are generally terminated after 12 to 18 months. 3 In the study by Keenan, Fons, and Carty (1998) (Keenan, Fons and Carty, 1998) . In this paper we use Moody's rating data to try to answer two questions with respect to this statement. First, is it true that there is a difference between watch-preceded rating action and direct, i.e., not-review preceded, rating action? Second, if so, how can we explain this difference? Based on our results, we then argue whether the review process has enhanced the rating agencies' traditional role as information providers.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on information provision by credit rating agencies. With seminal studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1992) , there is now an established set of empirical results with respect to the informational content of rating changes. Most of the studies find that the rated firms' equity reacts negatively to downgrades, but rarely observe a significant reaction to positive rating changes (Cantor, 2004; Vassalou and Xing, 2005 Few studies have yet examined the informational content of the watchlist instrument.
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) use S&P's Credit Watch data in the period 1981 to 1983 and find tentative evidence that watch-preceded rating downgrades provide less information than rating changes not preceded by a formal review process. However, their small sample size hampers reliable inferences. Hill and Faff (2007) , in contrast, conclude from sovereign ratings that the market does not react any differently to the two types of rating changes. They observe that prior to a watch-preceded downgrade, the market seems to anticipate the event by displaying negative returns but has a significantly positive reaction after the downgrade. 6 Norden and Weber (2004) report similar anticipation effects of corporate rating reviews both on stock and credit default swap (CDS) markets. Purda (2007) distinguishes between expected and unexpected rating changes, where rating reviews are one among several ingredients affecting rating change expectations. She concludes that there are no differences in market reaction to anticipated versus surprise rating changes. Chung, Frost, and Kim (2008) are the first to give an extensive overview on the characteristics and information value of credit watches. They observe that watch-preceded rating changes are more often triggered by corporate events than are direct rating actions and that the watchlist instrument helps rating agencies to supply information to financial markets. Our paper enhances these earlier studies in at least two ways: first, we investigate in more detail the economic function underlying the review procedure. Essentially, we test between two different explanations for this particular rating instrument. Second, and in contrast to earlier work, we draw inferences not only from market-reaction studies but use several approaches to discriminate between the two lines of argument. This allows us to take a more robust view on the role of credit rating agencies in financial markets.
As a first pre-study, we employ Moody's estimated senior unsecured ratings between leverage. Regarding cross-sectional aspects, stronger market effects are generally found for downgrades to and within the sub-investment-grade rating category (Goh and Ederington, 1999 to the institutional implementation of the watchlist on October 1, 1991. The market reaction is measured by the rated companies' cumulative abnormal stock returns. In line with earlier work, we find a significant reaction following negative rating changes only, but not following upgrades. Comparing the pre-watchlist period (April 26, 1982 -September 1991 with the post-watchlist period (October 1991 -December 2004), we see that the informational content of downgrades significantly increased after the watchlist introduction. This result is robust to business-cycle effects, regulatory changes and sample-composition effects and, consequently, underlines the conjecture implicit in the initial Moody's statement that the watchlist instrument has in some sense influenced rating agencies' traditional role as information providers.
In our main analysis, we test between two different explanatory lines for the review procedure: first, the creation of an additional rating process via the watchlist may be a simple means to comply with investors' demand for accurate and timely, but also stable rating information (Cantor and Mann, 2006) . According to this argument, a watchlist may be invoked whenever investors' needs for information are particularly strong (Chung, Frost and Kim, 2008) , so that the watchlist helps to improve the information-certification role of credit ratings. As an alternative, however, it has recently been argued that credit ratings may also be used as an instrument to coordinate investors' anticipation of credit risk (Carlson and Hale, 2006). As a consequence, an intensive monitoring process via the watchlist should allow rating agencies to influence firms' risk choices by threatening them with imminent rating downgrades and subsequent investor reactions. In a theoretical model, Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) have shown that this "implicit contract" feature enables watch-preceded credit ratings to convey information of a different quality:
Whereas a direct downgrade signals a firm's lack of capability to uphold a specific credit quality, a watch-preceded downgrade signals a failure in the attempt. According to this argument, the watchlist gives rise to an active monitoring role of rating agencies.
Since both explanatory approaches are particularly convincing for the case of negative developments in credit quality, our further analyses focus on imminent rating downgrades. 7
The two arguments ("delivering information" versus "implicit contracting") allow the derivation of distinct predictions both with respect to the watchlist-placement of firms, the length of the review procedure and the market reaction to direct vs. watch-preceded rating changes. Interestingly, our empirical analyses indicate that we have have to differentiate between high-quality borrowers and low-quality borrowers. For the former, we find that the watchlist procedure is mainly used to deliver precise and stable information in order to feed investors' demand. Particularly the decision to list a firm on review depends strongly on investors' quest for information. The market reaction to a subsequent downgrade is moreover similar to the reaction to a direct downgrade. For low-quality borrowers, in contrast, we find strong evidence that the review instrument is used as an implicit contract in order to induce the rated companies to abstain from further risk-enhancing actions.
In accordance with this line of argument, we observe that the market reacts much less strong to a watch-preceded downgrade than to a direct rating change. The introduction of the review procedure hence seems to have indeed enhanced the agencies' traditional role as information providers. At least vis-à-vis issuers of weak credit quality, the agencies appear to take on a beneficial monitoring function, inducing the rated firms to reduce their credit risk.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data set and lays out its main characteristics. Section 3 examines the information content of rating changes before and after the introduction of the watchlist instrument. Section 4 contains the main analyses and tests between the two potential explanatory lines underlying the review procedure. Section 5 concludes. 7 I.e. we employ data from watchlist placements with designation downgrade (leading to either an actual downgrade or a confirmation of the initial rating) and from direct downgrades.
Data Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Our data comprise the complete history of Moody's estimated senior unsecured ratings of U.S. issuers. 8 Since Moody's started to add numerical modifiers to its letter ratings on April 26, 1982, we choose to exclude all rating information prior to this date. Consistent with the existing literature, we convert Moody's letter ratings into a numerical scale, where 1 is equivalent to Aaa, 2 is equivalent to Aa1,..., and 21 is equivalent to C.
We make several further refinements to our raw data. First, as we match rating information with firm-specific data later on (taken from Compustat and from the Center for Research on Securities Prices, CRSP), we restrict the reported database to include only those firms' ratings for which firm-specific information is available. Second, we delete all watchlist entries that lead to rating reversals (e.g., additions to the watchlist with direction upgrade that were downgraded subsequently). This deletion of data is uncritical, as we lose only six observations altogether. Third, we control for contaminated rating changes This again confirms the perception that the watchlist has become an important tool for rating agencies. A summary of the size distribution of downgrades (upgrades) is provided in Table 3 (4). During the pre-watchlist era, we find a higher proportion of more-than-onenotch rating downgrades as compared to both the post-watchlist period, in general, and watchlist-downgrades, in particular. In contrast, whereas 49 percent of all downgrades in the pre-watchlist period are a change by one notch, this proportion rises to 57 percent in the post-watchlist era. This may at least partly be a consequence of the favorable economic conditions prevailing during most of the 1990s, given that the number of downgrades is positively correlated with recessions. In the post-watchlist period, however, watch-preceded downgrades seem to be slightly larger than direct downgrades (the proportion of rating changes larger than three notches is a bit higher). Very similar results are obtained with respect to upgrades.
Watchlist assignments may be triggered either by discrete corporate events or by trends in a company's operations or financial data. In our analyses, we frequently differentiate between these two types of review placements. In our sample, roughly 30 percent of all watch listings are event-driven. Most of them are related to mergers or acquisitions.
Even though we may expect to observe unique effects related to event-driven watch listings -given the specific corporate circumstances surrounding the review procedure -we do not find any striking differences from an ex-ante perspective. In particular, the mean duration of the review procedure is 101 days on average; it is 105 days for event-driven watches and 99 days for non-event driven watches -an insignificant difference.
3 Does the Watchlist Instrument Change the Informational Content of Credit Ratings?
In order to find out whether or not the introduction of the watchlist instrument has generally influenced the information content of ratings, we use a standard event study methodologyà la MacKinlay (1997) . Effectively, we test for a time-break in the impact of rating changes on the value of firm equity, i.e., on the cumulative abnormal stock return, at the time of the formal introduction of the watchlist on October 1, 1991. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is computed as the cumulative stock return over the event window minus the return of the market portfolio. The event window spans three days, beginning at -1 and ending at +1, with the event being the direct rating change or review-preceded rating change. Our estimation window spans the time period -120 to -20.
We take stock price information from CRSP daily tapes and calculate the market model using the value-weighted index in CRSP.
Based on the Moody's quotation, we expect to observe a larger market reaction to rating changes (disregarding any differences between direct rating changes and watchpreceded changes) in the post-watchlist period:
Hypothesis 1 The effect of rating changes on the market value of firm equity is stronger in the post-watchlist era, as compared to the era before the introduction of the watchlist procedure. Table 5 presents the results of a univariate test, where we analyze the effects of rating changes on cumulative abnormal stock returns, differentiating between market reactions before and after the introduction of the watchlist procedure. In line with earlier studies, we find statistically significant (negative) CARs only following downgrades. Furthermore, the general market reaction to downgrades is stronger in the post-watchlist era (with a CAR of -3.1 percent) than in the pre-watchlist period (with only -1.89 percent). The difference is both statistically and economically significant. This result lends support to Hypothesis 1, as it indicates that ratings have, indeed, become more informative since the introduction of the watchlist, thereby increasing the negative stock price reaction to a rating downgrade. For upgrades, in contrast, we find no significant market reaction. 10
We now proceed to a test in a multivariate framework. As the univariate analysis indicated insignificant CAR effects from upgrades, we focus solely on downgrades in the following, 11 using model 1,
In line with Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) We expect to find a negative coefficient for RCHANGE. To the extent that a rating change conveys new information to the market, a downgrade should raise the firm's future debt refinancing costs and, hence, lower the firm's market value. This negative effect should increase in the size of the rating change. Note that the probability of default rises exponentially with decreasing rating notches, so that a downgrade by two notches has an effect on the firm's net worth more than twice as large as a one-notch rating change.
10 Note that our results do not change if we use different methods of calculating CARs. As an alternative, e.g., we used the method by Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991). 11 The results from rating upgrades are available from the authors upon request.
The variable IGRADE is expected to display a negative coefficient as well. Large investors, pension funds in particular, are usually not allowed to hold non-investment grade rated products. 12 When bonds pass the boundary to junk status, portfolio managers are often forced to sell. Thus, the market for investment-grade bonds may differ substantially in terms of participants, volume, and risk preferences from the market for junk bonds, leading to a downward jump in CAR due to a crossing of the investment-grade boundary.
However, as we use issuer ratings (senior unsecured ratings), this effect may be weaker than for issue ratings.
With respect to regressor DAYS, both a positive and a negative coefficient may be conceivable. On the one hand, the longer the time period between two sequential ratings, the stronger may be the informational novelty of a downgrade, leading to a strongly negative effect on CAR. On the other hand, the more time passes, the more likely it becomes that the market has already updated its belief with respect to the creditworthiness of the borrower based on other pieces of private and public information. In this case, a rating change no longer conveys new information to the market (Jorion, Liu, and Shi, 2005). A downgrade may even lead to a positive market reaction if it is less pronounced than the unconfirmed market pessimism.
Our key variable in model 1 is the interaction of RCHANGE with the POSTWLdummy. If this variable turns out to be significantly negative, this should confirm Hypothesis 1 that the introduction of the watchlist has increased the informational content of rating events. We also include interaction terms with the IGRADE and DAYS variables.
The results of model 1 are presented in Table 6 , column 2. While the coefficient of the variable RCHANGE shows the expected negative sign, a significant reaction is only observed after the introduction of the watchlist, i.e. in the interaction term. Furthermore, the economic significance of the interaction variable is four times as strong as that of the simple RCHANGE regressor (−0.016 vs. −0.004). The crossing of the investment grade boundary, in contrast, turns out not to be significant. However, the market reacts significantly positive to the DAYS variable before the introduction of the review procedure.
While the effect remains positive in the post-watchlist era, it is much weaker both in statistical and economic significance. Our results hence indicate that the informational content of rating downgrades has strongly risen after the introduction of the watchlist. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
In order to render our results more robust, we consider additional factors that may have influenced our observations. Chief among them are time trends and sample composition effects. With regard to time trends, we use two alternative specifications. First, we include a set of (n-1) year dummies into the regression equation One further robustness check concerns the development of corporate financial risk over our sample period and the exponential relation between rating notches and probability of default. By using RCHANGE as an explanatory variable in the basic model, we have implicitly assumed that the distribution of firms across rating notches is stationary over the entire period. If, however, the composition of our sample shifts over time to lower rating categories, and in these lower rating categories a one-notch rating change implies a larger increase in default probability, then a sheer sample composition effect may just as well yield the results that we have found. 14 To capture these effects, we include the initial rating level into model 5.
As can be seen from Table 6 , column 6, the rating level has a highly significant negative coefficient. Its inclusion strongly increases the regression's R 2 , but it does not change the overall results obtained in model 1 with respect to the POSTWL*RCHANGE variable.
We interpret this as evidence that there is, indeed, a sample composition effect, which partly explains the increased strength of the announcement effect in the post-watchlist era. However, we are left with an unexplained part that we attribute to the enhanced informational value of the observed rating action. In sum, we find evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1. 13 Note that we use issuer ratings in our empirical analysis, while Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) use issue ratings. This may, at least partly, explain the insignificant coefficient. 14 From earlier studies, we know that a rating improvement by one notch, say from Baa3 to Ba1, raises the probability of default from 0.52 percent to 0.81 percent. However, a rating change from Ba3 to B1, which is also one notch, raises the default probability from 2.69 percent to 4.04 percent, i.e., four times more than in the first case ( rating events, they tend to react more aggressively than is warranted ex-post. Agency ratings, in contrast, are supposed to reflect changes in credit quality only when they are "unlikely to be reversed within a relatively short period of time" (Cantor, 2001) . 16 According to this argument, watchlists may help to alleviate the traditional conflict between rating stability and accuracy in that they allow agencies to "buy time forth by the agency. These incentives should be the higher, the larger is the anticipated effect of a rating downgrade on the company's credit costs. Also the firm's management quality may be expected to influence the length of the watchlist procedure. Finally, a watch-preceded downgrade signals that the firm has tried to exert the necessary effort but has failed in the attempt to comply with all the conditions raised by the agency to uphold the initial rating level. The market should hence be expected to react much less strong than to a direct downgrade, which -according to this "implicit contracting" argument -mirrors the deemed incapability of the firm to exert any recovery effort at all. 18
The two lines of argument, delivering-information vs. implicit-contracting, hence lead to different projections both with respect to the decision to place a borrower under review, the length of the watchlist and the market reaction to direct vs. watch-preceded rating changes. Hypothesis 2 sums up the conjectures:
Hypothesis 2 If the watchlist is used as an instrument to deliver information, i) the decision to place a borrower under review will be triggered by investors' demand for information about this borrower; ii) the length of the review procedure will depend on the firm's complexity; iii) the effect of a watchlist-preceded downgrade on the value of firm equity will be of similar magnitude as the effect of a direct downgrade.
If, in contrast, the review procedure forms an implicit contract between rating agency and rated firm, i) the decision to list a borrower on watch will depend on the fundamental credit quality of the firm; ii) the duration of the watchlist will be determined by the firm's incentives to comply with the criteria set forth by the agency; iii) the market reaction should be less strong to a watch-preceded downgrade than to a direct downgrade.
18 Note that in the original model by Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) , the authors assume that investors have perfect knowledge about the rated firms' credit quality, but cannot observe the realization of recovery effort. They hence conjecture that new information can enter the market only via watch-preceded downgrades. Softening this extreme assumption about investors' knowledge, also direct downgrades will deliver informational content as they inform on a company's incapability to exert effort. This may reasonably be expected to trigger a stronger market reaction than watch-preceded downgrades, that show that effort has been exerted but was not completely successful.
Review placement
In order to test between the two explanatory lines, we first of all run a probit regression on the agency's decision which borrowers to place under review. Regressors are chosen in order to reflect investors' demand for information about a company's creditworthiness (delivering-information) and the fundamental quality of the rated company (implicitcontracting). The demand for information should be high if a large number of investors are interested in this company, i.e. if the company is large and has many outstanding ratings. We measure firm size by its total assets (SIZE) and calculate the number of outstanding (issuer and issue) ratings of the company (INTENSITY). Demand should also be high if the uncertainty surrounding the company is large. We measure uncertainty by the stock-price volatility in the 100 days before the watchlist placement (VOLATILITY).
Also, fixed assets could be an inverse proxy for uncertainty about the company (FIXED ASSETS). Furthermore, investors should be particularly keen on precise information if the firm is close to the investment-grade boundary. We therefore include a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm's initial rating is Baa and zero otherwise The results are presented in Table 7 . Splitting the sample in a first step into lowquality borrowers with a non-investment grade (NIG) rating and high-quality borrowers with an investment-grade (IG) rating, we observe that both sets of regressors seem to make a contribution. Yet, examining the results more carefully shows that only the size variable and the stock-price volatility have an equally significant, positive effect on the watchlist placement decision in both subsets. Otherwise, fundamental quality variables seem to be more relevant for NIG borrowers, while demand-related factors appear more significant for IG issuers. This first indication is confirmed if we further differentiate between event-driven review placements and those not triggered by a corporate event.
As event-driven watch listings will obviously depend strongly on the triggering corporate event, our discrimination between delivering-information and implicit-contracting should be clearest for the non-event driven watchlist placements. Indeed, concluding from column 5, for this subgroup of watch listings we observe that a non-investment graded firm is the more likely to be placed under review the lower its interest payments, the higher its leverage, its market-to-book value and its stock-price volatility. Thus, three out of four significant regressors refer to the implicit-contracting argument. An investment-grade rated company, in contrast, is the more likely to be dealt a watch listing (column 6), the larger the company, the higher its leverage, the higher its stock volatility and if it is not too close to the investment-grade boundary -here factors referring to investors' demand for information preponderate.
For event-driven watchlist placements, the results are not quite as clear. We find that for both low-and high-quality borrowers a review listing becomes more likely, the higher the market-to-book value, the larger the company and the higher the stock-price volatility. Still, for NIG issuers we find that the leverage has a negative influence (while being significant only at the 10-% level), while for IG issuers both the level of fixed assets and the Baa-dummy show a significantly negative coefficient. 19 These are hints -though slightly weaker ones than for non-event driven watch listings -that rating agencies use the review procedure as an instrument to deliver precise and accurate information particularly for borrowers of high creditworthiness and employ it as an implicit contract for low-quality issuers.
Over and above this general result, it is interesting to note that the leverage variable has a positive influence on the decision to place a borrower under a non-event driven review. This result is counterintuitive at first sight: a higher leverage -taken as a sign of weaker credit quality -should make a direct downgrade more likely. However, a higher leverage may also increase the firm's incentives to comply with the criteria set forth via the review placement. Anticipating this effect, the agency may be induced to place issuers with high leverage on review more easily. Given the particularly high significance of this regressor for NIG borrowers, this supports our interpretation that implicit contracting 19 It should also be mentioned that event-driven watch listings appear to be more homogeneous than non-event driven placements. This leads to a higher R 2 in the respective regressions.
seems to play an important role for low quality issuers.
A second counterintuitive result is obtained with respect to the Baa-dummy. According to our analysis, being extremely close to the non-investment grade boundary reduces the probability of being placed under review. This may have to do with the fact that watch-preceded downgrades are often larger than one rating notch. As such, the crossing of the investment-grade boundary would be almost inevitable for these borrowers should the downgrade occur, which reasonably reduces the willingness of rating agencies to place these issuers on watch in the first place.
Watchlist duration
Using the same partition of non-event and event-driven watchlist placements on the one hand and of NIG and IG borrowers on the other, we run an OLS regression on the length of the review procedure in days. According to the delivering-information explanation, factors relating to the complexity of the firm's operations and data should determine the watchlist duration. We include the firm's stock-price volatility as our main measure of complexity and expect to find a positive effect should the delivering-information function prevail.
Additionally, we use the firm's size, its fixed assets and cash holdings as further controlling factors. Given that the average firm in our dataset is already relatively large, we assume that firm complexity may even increase in firm size. Higher fixed assets and higher cash holdings, in contrast, should make it easier to evaluate the company's creditworthiness.
With respect to the implicit-contracting argument, the review duration should depend on the firm's incentives to comply with the criteria set forth by the agency. We conjecture that the firm should be more willing to exert recovery effort -so that the watchlist length will be reduced -the larger the number of outstanding ratings and the closer the company is to the investment grade boundary. Also, the current level of interest payments and leverage should have a decreasing effect on the review duration. Finally, a management of higher quality may be able to comply with the agency's requests more quickly. As a consequence, the firm's size and its market-to-book value -as typical measures for management quality (Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits, 2006 ) -should exert a negative impact as well. Table 8 displays the results. We observe that the size variable has significant (negative) explanatory power for non-event driven watch listings. Thus, the larger the company, the less time is needed to resolve the watchlist procedure. This corresponds with the implicit-contracting argument, according to which a management of higher quality -measured by the firm's size -can lead to a quicker resolution of the watchlist. The economic significance of this explanatory variable is strongest for low-quality borrowers.
This finding underlines our earlier conclusion that the implicit-contracting feature of the watchlist seems to be most relevant for low-quality borrowers. The market-to-book value as an alternative proxy for management quality displays a negative coefficient, too, but turns out not to be significant.
Further significant effects are obtained for event-driven watchlist placements. Here, we observe that cash holdings reduce the duration of the review procedure, but this variable loses its significance when differentiating between NIG and IG borrowers. The level of fixed assets exerts a strongly positive effect on the duration of the watchlist, while the Baa-dummy reduces it, but only for IG borrowers.
In sum we have to conclude that analyzing the watchlist duration delivers less discriminatory results as compared to the decision on which firms to place under review.
Still, we obtain weak evidence that implicit contracting seems to play a more important role for borrowers of lower quality.
Market reaction
The test of the market reaction to direct vs. watch-preceded rating changes starts again with a univariate approach. Table 9 displays the CARs following from direct and watchpreceded rating changes in the post-watchlist period. We find that direct rating downgrades trigger a much stronger market reaction (-3.65 percent) than watch-preceded downgrades (-2.19 percent). The difference is also highly significant (at the 1 percent-level).
If we differentiate between event-driven and non-event driven watch listings, the general result remains the same. Yet, for non-event driven watchlist placements, the difference turns out not to be significant.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the results so far considered only the "offwatch" effects. This procedure tends to underestimate the true stock market reaction to rating changes, because the anticipatory effect implicit in the price reaction to the announcement of a rating's addition to the watchlist has been neglected. Yet, as there is a strong dependence between the initial watchlist designation and the final resolution, 20
we believe that a simple summing up of on-watch and off-watch CARs is not a sensible approach. Additionally, if issuers are, indeed, affected by the watchlist procedure, their quality will change over the course of the review procedure, so that on-and off-watch effects do not relate to the same corporate entity and, therefore, should not be aggregated (Hirsch and Krahnen, 2007) . In order to take the market reaction to the watchlist addition into account while not simply summing up non-comparable CAR-values, we conduct an additional univariate robustness test, where CARs have been measured using a longer event window, starting one day before the watchlist announcement and ending one day after the watchlist resolution. 21 To facilitate comparability, we use the mean length of the watchlist period in our sample as the length of the event window for direct rating changes as well. Results are displayed in Table 10 . As can be seen, our former result is confirmed: The market reacts much more strongly to direct rating downgrades than to watch-preceded downgrades, with a strongly significant difference.
When analyzing the market reaction in a multivariate approach, we face a clear selection problem: according to our earlier analyses, rating agencies preselect firms for addition to the watchlist, so that the difference in effects from direct rating action versus watchpreceded rating action becomes endogenous. In order to account for this preselection, we split our empirical model into two separate regressions, following the Heckman correction 20 In our sample, for instance, the probability of a downgrade, given the firm is placed on watchlist with designation downgrade, is 0.64. 21 In our sample, the watchlist spans a time period between 13 and 271 days. The mean length is 101 days.
approach (Heckman, 1979) . The first regression contains the agency's decision to put a firm on the watchlist, as studied in section 4.2. The second captures the relation of interest between the rating change and the market's reaction to it.
Our final test of Hypothesis 2 hence uses the following model:
Here, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for firm j; RCHANGE, Results are displayed in Table 11 . For NIG borrowers the predictions of the implicitcontracting argument are clearly confirmed: we observe a significantly negative effect of RCHANGE and a significantly positive effect of the interaction variable WATCH-LIST*RCHANGE, both for event-driven watch listings and non-event driven placements.
For IG issuers, in contrast, we do not find any significant coefficients related to the rating change variables. Only the DAYS variable displays a significant (positive) coefficient.
Qualitatively similar results are also obtained from a simple OLS-regression on the market reaction, where we interact a watchlist-dummy with RCHANGE. 22 Overall, this leads us to conclude that the introduction of the watchlist has changed the traditional role of credit rating agencies, indeed. At least for borrowers of lower creditworthiness it seems that it has allowed the agencies to take on an active monitoring role vis-à-vis the firms 22 Results are available upon request.
they rate, so that watch-preceded rating changes contain information of a different quality than direct rating changes.
Conclusion
Our study examined whether Moody's formal introduction of the watchlist procedure in 1991 influenced the informational content of credit ratings and possibly extended the economic role that rating agencies play in financial markets. We find that after the introduction of the review instrument, rating downgrades lead to stronger market reactions than in the pre-watchlist period. Furthermore, our empirical study lends support to the hypothesis that the watchlist procedure allows rating agencies to enter into an implicit contract with the rated firms, as has been suggested by Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) , at least for borrowers of low credit quality. Consequently, rating reviews add a finer level of detail to information in financial markets: whereas direct rating downgrades make a statement on issuers' lack of capability to sustain their credit quality, watchlist downgrades inform market participants of borrowers' lack of success in the attempt to do so.
In this respect, our study confirms the initial statement by Moody's that rating changes for issuers placed on the watchlist are different from those not preceded by a review procedure. The watchlist instrument seems to have partly developed into an active monitoring device that allows the rating agencies to exert real pressure on the reviewed
companies. An interesting question arises from this observation: Was the review procedure introduced with this objective or did it unintentionally develop into such a specific instrument? While our study did not focus on this particular question and, hence, cannot provide an answer, we would like to point out that watchlists seem to have a different impact with respect to sovereign ratings (Hill and Faff, 2007) . It is possible that the The table provides the cumulative abnormal returns following direct and watch-preceded downgrades. The sample consists of 1810 uncontaminated rating events in the post-watchlist period from October 1, 1991, to December 31, 2004. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated over a three-day event window (-1,+1) around the date the rating change becomes effective. The CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return minus the return of the market portfolio, where the market portfolio is given by the value-weighted portfolio from CRSP. Wilcoxon T values are given below the median and t-values below the mean. ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Mean and median values are tested using one-sided t-test and Wilcoxon T test, respectively. The table provides the cumulative abnormal returns following direct and watch-preceded downgrades. The sample consists of 1810 uncontaminated rating events in the post-watchlist period from October 1, 1991, to December 31, 2004. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated over a event window beginning one day before the watchlist placement and ending one day after the watchlist resolution for firms coming from watchlist. For direct downgrades the event window is set as the the median length of the watchlist period in our sample. The CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return minus the return of the market portfolio, where the market portfolio is given by the value-weighted portfolio from CRSP. Wilcoxon T values are given below the median and t-values below the mean. ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Mean and median values are tested using one-sided t-test and Wilcoxon T test, respectively. The sample consists of 1810 non-contaminated downgrades in the period between October 1, 1991 and December 31, 2004. Ratings are issuer ratings provided by Moody's. The sample contains direct downgrades as well as downgrades following watchlist placements. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). It is calculated over a three-day event window (-1,+1) around the date the rating change becomes effective. The CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return minus the return of the market portfolio, where the market portfolio is given by the value-weighted portfolio from CRSP. RCHANGE is the absolute value of rating change in notches; IGRADE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the rating downgrade crosses the investment grade boundary, and 0 otherwise; DAYS is the log of the number of days since the last rating change (downgrades as well as upgrades); WATCHLIST is an estimated variable following from the earlier probit regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. t-values are given in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are used. 
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